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Fiddling while carbon burns: why climate policy 









Effective climate policy requires global emissions of greenhouse gases to be cut
substantially, which can be achieved by energy supply technologies with lower
emissions, greater energy use efﬁciency and substitution in demand. For policy to be
efﬁcient requires at least fairly uniform, fairly pervasive emission pricing from taxes,
permit trading or combinations of the two; and signiﬁcant government support for
low-emission technologies. We compare the technology-focused climate policies
adopted by Australia and the ‘Asia–Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate’ (AP6), against this policy yardstick. We ﬁnd that such policies omit the need
for emission pricing to achieve abatement effectively and efﬁciently; they over-
prescribe which abatement actions should be used most; they make unrealistic
assumptions about how much progress can be achieved by voluntarism and cooperation,
in the absence of either adequate funding or mandatory policies; and they unjustiﬁably
contrast technology-focused policy and the Kyoto Protocol approach as the only two








Recognition has grown that climate change is a serious issue that needs to be
addressed, and that global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will need to be
cut substantially by mid-century (Stern 2006; IPCC 2007). However, dis-
agreement is widespread over who should act, when and with what policy
mechanisms.
Australia has been a key player in the Asia–Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (referred to as AP6, after the six countries in the
partnership: Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the USA). AP6
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essentially is a voluntary agreement to promote cleaner energy technology. Its
main stated purpose is to ‘create a voluntary, non-legally binding framework
for international cooperation to facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment,
and transfer of existing, emerging and longer term cost-effective, cleaner,
more efﬁcient technologies and practices’ (AP6 2006, Charter, 2.1.1). Any
contributions to funding are voluntary, and there are no commitments to
emission targets or timetables.
A focus on technology development is in line with a growing recognition
that in order to achieve the deep cuts in global greenhouse emissions eventually
needed to stabilise atmospheric concentrations at ‘safe’ levels, fundamental
shifts in energy systems will be necessary over the next half century (EFF
2006). However, Australian federal climate policy, deﬁned in March 2007 by
DFAT (2007), excluded other key policy options. In particular, it argued that
the Kyoto Protocol approach of emissions targets and timetables (which
Australia did not ratify) is not working, and ignored the possible use of
economic instruments such as permit trading or emissions taxes in Australia.
But 2006 was a watershed year for global debate on climate policy, spurred
notably by the UK Treasury’s Stern Review on the economics of climate




Then in December, the Australian Prime Minister announced his Task
Group on Emissions Trading (Howard 2006), starting a period of intense




Given this often fast-moving debate, we choose in most of the next section
to examine the fundamentals of an effective and efﬁcient climate policy,
rather than the details of any Australian or world transition to such a policy,
though at the end we acknowledge the importance and controversy of the
latter. We thus identify a standard against which to compare any actual climate
policy, past, current or future. We then focus in Section 3 on Australian
policy in 2006, represented by government and AP6 documents, and ask if





 likely to be effective in reducing GHG emissions; and how they
measure up against the yardstick of an effective and efﬁcient climate
policy.  Our arguments recognise that the Kyoto Protocol falls far short of
effectiveness and efﬁciency, mainly because it omits targets for many




. 2003); that there is a key role for a substantial





This paper was prepared during the debate before the Task Group’s report was released on
1 June 2007 (PM&C 2007). On 3 June, Prime Minister Howard announced his acceptance of
the report’s key recommendation, that a carbon emissions trading system be introduced uni-
laterally in Australia by 2012 at the latest, but with no long-term target to be set until 2008
(Howard 2007). This represented Government acceptance of the key arguments of this
paper about efﬁciency, but not yet about effectiveness. It also remained to be seen which of the
report’s detailed recommendations for trading system design would be implemented. 
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2. The elements of effective and efﬁcient climate policy
2.1 Effectiveness: the need to cut total emissions of GHGs
 
The starting point, no longer in serious dispute, is that global, anthropogenic,
net additions to GHG emissions, most of which is carbon dioxide from fossil
fuel burning, will cause and are already causing climate change, the speed
and direction of which will be damaging to most, if not all countries (IPCC
2001, 2007). Since GHGs are long-lived, global pollutants, and since global
output (GDP) is growing, effective climate policy must achieve signiﬁcant
reductions in global GHG emissions, not just in GHG intensities (emissions
per dollar of output). To stabilise global GHG concentrations at levels that
limit the risk of severe future climate change damage, annual global
emissions will need to be cut substantially in the coming decades. For




equivalent (around twice the preindustrial level) is estimated to require a 25
per cent cut compared to current annual emissions by 2050 (Stern 2006, p. xi),
an average cut of 0.6 per cent/year, compared to average global growth over








Combined with continued output growth, this means global economic activity
must be rapidly ‘de-carbonised’.
The need to cut global emissions substantially means that all major emitters





 emissions, and China and the European Union for
around 15 per cent each. Historical contributions to GHG concentrations in
the atmosphere are mainly from developed countries, which also have much




/person  year in the OECD,




/person  year in the non-OECD). However, expected
future annual emissions growth is predominantly from industrialising countries
such as China and India, so their involvement in efforts to reduce emissions is
crucial. However again, the need to include all major emitters cannot excuse
small, rich countries like Australia and Canada from their responsibilities.
 
2.2 Efﬁciency – I: the need for emission pricing
 
A globally efﬁcient (i.e. cost-effective) policy requires emissions cuts at a
similar marginal cost in all countries, and on all sources of emissions where
control policies are practicable. To achieve this efﬁciency, we and many
others, such as CBO (2006) and Stern (2006, xviii) contend that climate policy




 as its centrepiece; though there also very much








 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production, 1972–2002,
from the World Resources Institute’s 
 
Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
 
 database, version 3, on-
line at http://cait.wri.org/. 
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of new, low-emission technologies (Stern 2006, p. xix), and for removal of
barriers to behavioural change, in particular to enable greater energy efﬁciency
(Stern 2006, p. xx). By emission pricing we mean governments creating a fairly
pervasive, fairly uniform price incentive to reduce emissions. Governments
do this either by setting an overall emissions cap and allowing emissions
permit trading within it (‘cap-and-trade’); or by taxing emissions (if politically
necessary, only above some emissions thresholds, as in Pezzey 2003); or with
some hybrid combination of trading and taxation. Two noteworthy hybrids
are international emissions trading within a maximum permit price, as in the
‘trigger price’ of Pizer (2002), or the ‘safety valve’ of Jacoby and Ellerman
(2004); and the plan in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) for an internationally
coordinated emission price, but emissions trading only within countries. The
initial distribution of permits or thresholds under any of these schemes has a
critical effect on equity, and arguably should not all be free (Bovenberg and




. (1999), emission pricing is more
efﬁcient within one country than alternative, frequently adopted policies such
as technology mandates and performance; however, in the international
context, including all major emitting countries is probably more important










 (or any GHG) control were neatly (if unwittingly) summarised by the
Australian Foreign Minister:




 in the atmosphere has the same effect wherever it
came from, and likewise, a ton avoided has the same impact whether it
is from reduced energy use, carbon capture and storage, renewable energy,




 in vegetation.’ (Downer 2006)
The ﬁrst reason to use emission pricing is thus that true global pollutants
like GHGs have the same effect wherever they come from, so it is fully efﬁcient
to use the same price incentive everywhere. The second and third reasons
are that GHG emissions are indeed pervasive, coming from almost all sectors
of the economy including consumption, so there are countless ways of abating
emissions, and a correspondingly huge range of marginal abatement costs;
but no cheap, practicable and universal options for end-of-pipe abatement
technologies. This also means that governments cannot reliably know, but
pervasive market forces can discover, where and how emissions should be
reduced or abated most cheaply.
The variation of marginal abatement costs across sources of GHGs is





. 2005). Reducing coal combustion, which has the highest GHG
emissions per unit of energy, is often among the least costly abatement
options, but other options exist at all parts of the marginal cost curve. A fully
efﬁcient policy requires a pervasive, uniform emission price signal. However, 
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in practice, full implementation of this ideal will prove impossible, hence our
qualiﬁcation that pricing should be ‘fairly pervasive, fairly uniform’.
An important but often overlooked part of the efﬁciency argument for





prices of the goods and services they consume include an element for embodied
GHGs. This is a general result of allowing markets to work freely. As an
example, suppose emissions are increased by electricity use but decreased by
spending on abatement; and that the government’s existing policy is to spend
a large sum directly on abating emissions, and raise the money for this from
general taxation of consumers that leaves electricity consumption unaffected.
From this starting point, now consider a two-part adjustment of policy. One
part is introducing a small tax on electricity, which shifts consumption
towards other goods, but causes a much smaller shift down in consumer
welfare. The other part is a more than offsetting reduction in general taxation,
of a size such that government spending on abatement is lower, but emissions
are unchanged overall thanks to the shift away from electricity. Society
then beneﬁts from the overall reduction in taxation (see the Appendix for a
formal proof).
The falls in fossil fuel output caused by pervasive emission pricing will
inevitably be greatest for coal, the most carbon-intensive fuel. With 48 per cent
of its total energy consumption supplied by coal, Australia is the most coal-
intensive country of the AP6, which is itself more coal-intensive (38 per cent)






tries will inevitably exert pressure on governments to resist emission pricing.
But pricing remains an essential part of the cost-minimising, long-run solution
for any nation’s economy, and can be made politically acceptable by giving
adequate compensation to coal-intensive sectors.
 
2.3 Efﬁciency – II: the need for technology policy
 
We now consider another key element of an effective and efﬁcient climate policy:
that of achieving enough innovation and deployment of new low emission
technologies, and enough deployment of existing low emission technologies.
Almost everyone agrees that such technological innovation and deployment
is vital if deep long-term cuts in GHG emissions are to be achieved cost-
effectively. There is also near-universal agreement that governments must
support innovation, because its beneﬁts to society cannot be fully captured
by those undertaking costly research and development (R&D) leading to
innovation. Government supports include: patent laws; subsidies for private
R&D, and perhaps prizes for innovation and encouraging vertical R&D
consortia to form (Montgomery and Smith 2007); and direct spending by
government R&D agencies.
However, three important qualiﬁcations apply to adopting a focus on
technology policy as the heart of climate policy. First, it costs serious money 
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– as noted below – and cannot be just a legal framework and exhortation.
Second, it is inherently hard for governments to spend serious money on
technology policy effectively and efﬁciently, because of ‘pork-barrelling’
problems such as overestimation of beneﬁts by vocal, geographically concentrated




. 2005). Examples of poor value from government technology spending
readily spring to mind, such as US projects on the supersonic airliner, the




. 1991). By creating
a potential market for technology, emission pricing can greatly help govern-
ment in the difﬁcult task of ‘picking winners’, for example, by making
proportional, technology-neutral subsidies more effective. Third, vital as it is,
even an effective and efﬁcient technology policy cannot be enough on its




low-emission technologies, whether old ones like insulation batts in construction,
or the use of high-efﬁciency coal-ﬁred boilers in new power stations in China
and India; or new technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS, also
known as geosequestration). Subsidised technology development can bring









125/tonne, if venting carbon dioxide to the
atmosphere remains free. Australia’s current reliance on coal makes it more
important to recognise this. An AP6 policy without adequate incentives for
deploying clean coal technology must eventually lead to big falls in global
coal demand, and hence Australian exports, if emissions are to be cut to
sustainable levels.
Emission pricing can also itself induce signiﬁcant amounts of innovation.
After a wide-ranging review of the quite divergent literature on induced
innovation, Popp (2006) concluded that earlier claims about the extent of
innovation induced through emission pricing may have been over-optimistic,
that support of R&D expenditure via subsidies or direct government ﬁnancing
will also be necessary, and that such expenditure will crowd out other R&D.
However, his central conclusion is that an emission pricing signal is still vital
for innovation: ‘. . . these technological gains will not occur without some
policy signal to innovators that energy efﬁciency research will be proﬁtable’.
 
2.4 Efﬁciency – III: the need to remove barriers to behavioural change
 
The removal of barriers to behavioural change, particularly to encourage
energy efﬁciency, is not a key focus of this paper, but it is important enough
to deserve a separate mention. As many studies show, demand-side energy









See, for example, Allen Consulting Group (2004, table 6.1) for Australia, and IEA (2006)
globally. 
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already highly cost-effective at current energy prices. The reasons for this
market failure include lack of reliable information, transaction costs,
incentives being split between owners and users, and other behavioural
factors like culture and inertia. There is thus a strong need, even with emissions
pricing, for well-designed and targeted regulatory measures to gradually
eliminate these reasons. Such measures include setting minimum standards
for buildings and appliances; labelling, advertising and providing other
information; subsidising selected energy efﬁciency investments; and educating
schoolchildren and the general public in climate change issues (Stern 2006,
chapter 17).
 
2.5 Efﬁciency – IV: the transitional need to minimise carbon leakage
 




 issue in Australian climate
policy debate. The intense controversy about it means that our conclusions
here are tentative and subject to political as well as economic judgement. If
Australia were to introduce emission pricing as part of any less-than-global
climate treaty, would lower emissions and output from its trade-exposed,
carbon-intensive industrial sectors be largely offset by ‘carbon leakage’?
(This is higher emissions and output from foreign competitors not subject to
emission pricing, which thus causes domestic economic pain in those sectors,
for little global environmental gain.) An Australian test case for this fear is
aluminium, the most carbon-intensive manufacturing sector and with 82 per




. 2006, tables 3 and 5). This problem
must be faced, since it is highly unlikely that all countries of the world, developed
and developing alike, will simultaneously join a climate treaty, so some
arrangements would be needed to minimise carbon leakage during a
transitional phase when Australia is subject to emission controls and some of
its key competitors are not.
Also, expectations about future emissions pricing are a key inﬂuence on
carbon leakage. If a future climate treaty were to chart a clear path toward
developing country commitments and thus foreshadow more global emission
pricing, incentives to shift output away from Australia would be much
reduced. Carbon leakage could also be minimised if sector targets for energy-
intensive commodities could be agreed for the main producing countries.




. have made a convincing case both that there are only a few, well-deﬁned
sectors like aluminium and steel that would be substantially affected by




 (taxes on imports from, and rebates for
exports to competing, uncontrolled countries) are well-established and
efﬁcient ways of preventing leakages for other commodities. Many details
remain to be ironed out for the case of carbon, but for a reasonable emissions
price, any localised economic cost caused by imperfections in border adjustments
seems in our view greatly outweighed by the long-term political and economic
beneﬁts of Australia moving from laggard to leader in global climate policy. 
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In conclusion, an effective and efﬁcient climate policy needs: action by all
major emitters, not excusing rich, small emitting countries from responsibility;
a central role for emission pricing policies like emissions trading, or an emission
tax, or hybrids of the two; signiﬁcant government ﬁnancial support for R&D
of new, low-emission technologies; government help to remove barriers to
behavioural change, particularly to improve energy efﬁciency; and adequate
transitional measures against carbon leakage, probably using border adjustments.
We now use the ﬁrst three of these four principles to assess the effectiveness
and efﬁciency of recent technology-focused climate policies.
 
3. A critical review of technology-focused climate policy and recent 
Australian research
 
A good summary of ‘technology-focused climate policy’ is in the AP6s
founding Vision Statement (AP6 2005), and its Charter, Communique and
Work Plan (AP6 2006). Our source for Australian climate policy as at March
2007 is DFAT (2007) and the statements announcing AP6 (Downer and




. 2005). Of greater technical interest is the





. 2006); and in our assessment of AP6, we include some of the













. (2006), a subsequent ABARE conference paper.
In general, technology-focused climate policy acknowledged fully the need
for all major emitters to play their part, and for rich small emitters to fulﬁl
their responsibilities too, although only DFAT (2007) explicitly acknowledged
‘the need to lower global greenhouse gas emissions’. Speciﬁcally with regard
to AP6, Australian policy pronouncements emphasised that AP6 countries
account for very nearly half of current global GHG emissions, and that
‘working together, this group can have a signiﬁcant impact on global
approaches towards climate change’ (Downer and Campbell 2005). We can
but agree, and point out that because of AP6’s size and the political importance
of its large members, if it joined serious negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate
treaty, it would transform them at a stroke. Despite the AP6 Charter statement
that it is ‘intended to complement but not replace the Kyoto Protocol’ (AP6
2006), McGee and Taplin (2006) argued that it is really a competing regime
that may lead to obstruction. Regarding the Kyoto Protocol, ofﬁcial Austral-
ian sources sometimes use circular reasoning: DFAT (2007) ‘does not believe
the Kyoto Protocol provides an effective global framework for meeting





(2006) complete the circle by noting that ‘The rejection of the Protocol by
the United States and Australia . . . seriously undermines its environmen-
tal effectiveness.’
With regard to the need for efﬁcient climate policy to use emission pricing
as its centrepiece, the silence of the technology-focused climate policy literature 
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. (2005, p. 5 and p. 55) fully acknowledged
the ‘least-cost’ property of emission pricing and the wide range of abatement









. (2006) – and all three papers have Fisher, Ford, Jakeman
and Matysek as common authors – other than to doubt its effectiveness in
stimulating innovation, as noted below. ABARE publications on climate
policy until 2005 advocated the use of emission pricing and recognised the




. 2004); but in 2006 –
when the AP6 initiative became operational – they strongly supported
technology policy and questioned the effectiveness of price-based policies.
And by marginalising market mechanisms, technology-focused climate policy
ends up ‘picking winners’: making strong assumptions about which technologies,
especially clean coal and CCS, should be used to achieve ‘practical results’,
but having next to no faith in markets to guide such decisions. CCS plays a




. (2006), but demand-side
energy efﬁciencies and substitution in demand are absent.
In March 2007, AP6 was however, weakest in its self-declared heartland.
Its documents effectively assumed that just a few hundred million dollars
spent on ‘working together’, ‘enhanced cooperation’ and ‘collaboration to promote
and create an enabling environment’, in the absence of any kind of mandatory
policies, could work like magic in providing ‘practical results’ in tackling the
largest and hardest technical, economic and political problem ever faced by
global environmental policy. For the sums then committed to AP6 were indeed









500 m through the government’s ‘Low Emissions Technology Demonstra-









to estimated average investment needs in the energy sector, without speciﬁc








 in Australia until














 So any presumption that AP6 will achieve serious results in
stimulating innovation in low carbon technologies was and is no more than
wishful thinking, unless funding is raised substantially.









. 2006), no costs of developing or deploying new technologies are
given, and many quantitative assumptions remain implicit and inaccessible.
In particular, no costing is given of how carbon capture technologies are




25–30/tonne, especially given the already









White House ‘Fact Sheet: The Asia–Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean Development and




The respective projections for Australia, and for North America and globally, come
from different sources with different underlying deﬁnitions and assumptions. 
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p. 4, p. 35 and p. 55). Finally, even if such technology would be available at
#25–30/tonne, no reason is given why emitters would deploy it, rather than
vent CO2 freely. So all Fisher et al.’s results are necessarily qualiﬁed as what
AP6 policies ‘could’, rather than ‘will’, achieve.
In Section 2, we noted that although government support for R&D is vital,
emission pricing can also induce signiﬁcant amounts of innovation. Central
to the contrary view in the emission pricing section of Fisher et al. (2006,
p. 21) is a claim, from what is now Montgomery and Smith (2007), that ‘market
mechanisms cannot send a credible and effective signal that would induce the
funding required to develop the technologies necessary for achieving deep
emissions cuts.’ This assumes there exists a single, as yet undiscovered innovation,
which once discovered and implemented will cheaply reduce emissions to low
levels, giving no reason ex post for governments to maintain a high emission
price, and hence no market repayment of the ﬁxed costs of innovation. In
reality, no single technological ﬁx exists; even if CCS is a ‘winner’, as
presumed by Fisher et al. there will be no one CCS technology suitable for all
types of power stations. In any case, Montgomery and Smith accept that a
‘relatively low’ emission price may be justiﬁable ‘to motivate emission
reductions through changes in utilisation of the existing capital stock, or new
capital investments using existing technologies’. A signiﬁcant piece of evidence
for the view that such reductions will be large is table M in Matysek et al.
(2005), which identiﬁes just over half the abatement in global CO2 emissions
in 2050 as coming from switching: from higher to lower carbon-intensive
fuels, improving energy efﬁciency, shifts in industry output towards less
emissions-intensive commodities and actions by households to reduce fuel use.
A ﬁnal general feature of technology-focused climate policy documents is
that they present false dichotomies. ‘Technology policy’ is presented as self-
evidently superior to a single, alternative climate policy, when in fact many
other, complex and continuous policy choices can be combined with it, over-
whelmingly so if the time horizon stretches to 2050. A stark choice is often
presented between a policy (like AP6) which is claimed to complement
economic development and energy security goals and to move towards
including all major emitters, and a policy (like Kyoto) which is claimed to
both ‘frustrate’ these goals and to be ineffective because it leaves out many
major emitters (Downer and Campbell 2005; DFAT 2007). This ignores the
countless developments which might follow on from Kyoto after 2012, and
the fact that slowing economic growth does not mean abandoning it
altogether. And in this respect, we note the stress in the Terms of Reference
of the Task Group on Emissions Trading (Howard 2006) on advising on
design of a workable global trading system (our emphasis) that preserves
Australia’s ‘major competitive advantages through the possession of large
reserves of fossil fuels and uranium’. This seemed then to refute from the
outset both the gradual decarbonisation of the economy that cost-effective
emission control requires, and the global need for developed countries to
take the lead in emissions control.Fiddling while carbon burns 107
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4. Conclusion
We have set out here the most fundamental elements of an effective and
efﬁcient policy to tackle global climate change. For policy to be effective, global
emissions of GHGs need to be cut, which means involving all major emitters,
while not excusing rich small emitters from meeting their responsibilities too.
For policy to be efﬁcient, the key broad policy elements are fairly uniform,
pervasive emission pricing from taxes, permit trading or combinations of the
two; and signiﬁcant government support for innovation of new, low-emission
technologies, through a mixture of patents, prizes, subsidies and direct spending.
We have not pretended that such an ideal policy mix is remotely easy to achieve
in practice: it remains by far the largest and hardest task environmental policy has
ever faced, and transitional arrangements are bound to be difﬁcult. But it does
serve as a yardstick against which to compare various policy initiatives.
We have argued that the kind of exclusively technology-focused climate
policy promoted by Australia and the USA in 2006 under the AP6 umbrella
fell far short of the ideal. Key inconvenient truths were ignored about the
economics of climate policy, especially the need to use emission pricing soon
to stimulate both cost-effective abatement actions now, and enough techno-
logical innovation for the future. Unrealistic assumptions were made about
how much innovation can be achieved by voluntarism and cooperation sup-
ported by only paltry funding, in the absence of either market price incentives or
mandatory measures. Market ﬂexibility was rejected in favour of costly winner-
picking, by over-prescribing which types of abatement should be used most.
Technology-focused policy and the Kyoto Protocol approach were falsely
presented as incompatible, ignoring the possibility of combining them and
many other options, especially for the transition to more comprehensive global
control, into a suite of climate policies to last well into the 21st century. Purely
technology-focused climate policy will either be very inefﬁcient or very ineffective.
Without a very large increase in funding, we fear the latter, meaning that
countries exclusively following such policies will be ﬁddling while carbon burns.
That said, since AP6 does include the United States, China and India, it
has the potential to make a difference for global climate policy, at least in
principle. And it is clear that technology policy, including for carbon capture
and storage, must play a vital part in efforts to reduce global, long-term
GHG emissions. Two things are necessary if not sufﬁcient to make current
Australian and AP6 climate policy effective and efﬁcient: devoting meaningful
resources to developing a broad range of technologies, and putting a signiﬁcant,
pervasive price on emissions.
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Appendix
How a shift towards emission pricing can lower overall taxation 
and increase welfare
Suppose that c = constant marginal private cost of electricity, p = price of
electricity = unit cost + tax (if any), q(p) = quantity of electricity consumed
(q′ < 0), a = spending on abatement, e(q,a) = rate of emissions (eq > 0, ea < 0),
and I = consumers’ (ﬁxed) income.
Under Policy 1, the government raises revenue a directly by general
taxation which does not affect electricity consumption, and spends a on
abatement. The price of electricity is p1 = c. Consumers get q1 = q(c) electricity,
I – cq1 – a other goods, and emissions are e1 = e(q1,a).
Under Policy 2, the government imposes a small tax of t on electricity, and
reduces abatement spending (and hence total taxation) to a − b. The price of
electricity is p2 = c + t. Consumers get q2 = q(c + t) < q1 electricity. The
government gets q2t revenue from the electricity tax, and now raises only
a – q2t – b by general taxation. So consumers get q2 electricity, I – (c + t)q2 –
(a – q2t – b) = I – cq2 – a + b other goods, and emissions are still e1 = e(q1,a) =
e(q2,a – b). (b is chosen so this holds exactly.)
Then to ﬁrst order, the changes from Policy 1 to Policy 2 are:
1. The value of the change in electricity consumption from q1 to q2 is –c(q1 – q2),
since c is the price and therefore unit value of electricity.  
2. The value of changed spending on other goods is I – cq2 – a + b – (I – cq1 – a) =
c(q1 – q2) + b.110 J.C.V. Pezzey et al.
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So the net effects of using Policy 2 instead of Policy 1 are to increase the value
of all consumers spending by b, the reduction in overall taxation, while leaving
emissions unchanged. So the overall effect must be to increase welfare.
(Such a simple partial equilibrium model does not allow for a rising marginal
cost of electricity, among other things. However, allowing for this would add
complexity without changing the basic conclusion.)